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UK Government: Reforming Financial Markets (Part 1) |
16 July 2009 |
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The paper principally builds on proposals around prudential supervision and systemic risk management carried in the Turner Review, but makes a number of interesting proposals beyond the scope of Lord Turner’s work. The meat of the paper is split. First it offers consultation on proposed policy where the government is firm in its proposals, covering:
Secondly, it offers consultation on policy areas where the government wants further input before reaching a firm policy conclusion, covering:
Over the next few weeks Chase Cooper will be examining elements of these proposals in more detail, and trying to predict what some of the more interesting practical outcomes will be if the government’s ideas pass into law and regulation. We start with the areas where the government is firm in its thinking. Proposed new powers for FSABeyond the very well-trailed proposals for giving the statutory objective for regulating financial stability to FSA, rather than the Bank of England, the government’s firm proposals cover some particularly interesting ground.The government proposes to introduce powers:
The government will also work with the FSA to assess whether FSA should be able to require information from additional participants in the financial markets – not directly regulated by FSA – where this is needed, for example, to carry out effective financial stability analysis. Penalties for non-Approved PersonsThis is both timely and understandable, but does introduce new hazard for firms and individuals. It is absolutely consistent with FSA’s public statements about taking disciplinary action against individuals where possible, because of the increased deterrent factor, and transfers a material amount of responsibility from the firm to the individual.Firms will need to ensure that they are rock solid in defining objective thresholds beyond which individuals will be carrying out Controlled Functions and so need FSA approval, with a very clear decision-making process where there are doubts. Individuals in senior roles will need to understand with clarity whether their role constitutes a Controlled Function – and if not, why not. We are therefore likely to see a material increase in defensive registrations. FSA, through HM Treasury, is clear that this proposal is targeted at individuals who avoid or evade obtaining Approved Person status in order do business and make profits whilst staying beyond FSA’s reach, but there is a risk that in due course it could be used to target senior individuals at firms with less tight registration and compliance processes as a tool to bring about improved controls. Use of intervention powersThe White Paper proposes that FSA should be able to exercise powers of intervention and vary Part IV Permissions on its own initiative in relation to any of its statutory objectives, rather than just in respect of the consumer protection objective. This obviously gives FSA the ability to intervene or vary in respect of the proposed new statutory objective for financial stability – which is interesting to say the least.This needs to be considered in the context of two other issues – the first is the new requirement for FSA to focus on understanding and challenging firms’ business models and strategies as well as their compliance with regulatory requirements, and the ability of FSA to amend firms’ Permissions – their permitted business activities – on its own initiative: the second is FSA’s exemption from liability for anything done in good faith in performance of its duties. Clearly FSA is being asked to exercise judgment around the future impact of a firm’s current business model, and to take action where the business model in FSA’s view may have a detrimental impact on financial stability: however, this is a delicate judgment and it is difficult to see any material negative impact for FSA if they take action with which the target firm disagrees, which is subsequently demonstrated to be wrong, and has cost the firm significant funds, or prevented it from carrying on legitimate business, in part or in total. SuspensionsThis looks like a superficial tidying measure. It is not clear why this additional power is necessary – the White Paper does not clarify the government’s thinking. FSA already has own-initiative powers to vary an authorised firm’s permission, effectively allowing FSA to remove the ability for a firm to undertake regulated business without actually cancelling the permission.Further, FSA may make Prohibition Orders against Approved Persons including a rider that the individual may apply for the order be revoked after a specified period of time has elapsed – as in the case of Christopher Headdon in 2004 – again, effectively a suspension. ConclusionFSA is becoming a new beast, with some serious new powers. Authorised firms will need to take serious steps to maintain their protection and regulatory relationship in the new environment. In next week’s issue we examine proposals around FSA delivering redress to large groups of consumers for widespread breaches.
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© Chase Cooper 2005-2010 |